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Personality, Roles, and Social Behavior

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Foreword

Personality and Roles: Sources of Regularities in Social Behavior

For behavioral scientists, whether they identify primarily with the science of psychology or with that of sociology, there may be no challenge greater than that of discovering regularities and consistencies in social behavior. After all, it is such regularities and consistencies that lend predictability to the behavior of individuals in social contexts—in particular, to those events that constitute dyadic interactions and group processes. In the search for behavioral consistencies, two theoretical constructs have emerged as guiding principles: personality and roles.

The theoretical construct of personality seeks to understand regularities and consistencies in social behavior in terms of relatively stable traits, enduring dispositions, and other propensities (for example, needs, motives, and attitudes) that are thought to reside within individuals. Because it focuses primarily on the features of individuals, the construct of personality is fundamentally psychological in nature. By contrast, the theoretical construct of roles seeks to understand regularities and consistencies in social behavior in terms of the directive influence of coherent sets of rules and prescriptions that are provided by the interpersonal, occupational, and societal categories of which individuals are continuing members. Because it focuses primarily on features of social structures, the construct of roles is fundamentally sociological in nature.

The fact of their differing disciplinary origins provides some sense as to why psychologists more so than sociologists seem to be relatively familiar with the concept of personality, and why sociologists more so than psychologists seem to be relatively conversant with the notion of roles. But, although the differing intellectual parentages of personality and roles may constitute an explanation for the disciplinary isolation of scholars working within the traditions associated with each construct, it hardly constitutes a justification for continuing that state of affairs. Prompted by their concerns about the solitudes within which psychologists and sociologists have worked, William Ickes and Eric Knowles have invited psychologists and sociologists to contribute chapters to this volume.

Chapter 6

The Forms of Social Awareness

Daniel M. Wegner and Toni Giuliano

The theme of this chapter can be expressed in two simple observations. The first is that a person can think about different things. The second is that even in thinking about one thing, the person may do so from different perspectives. Because these observations can be made with remarkable frequency in daily life, their importance is often cloaked in what Heider (1958) called the "veil of obviousness." We hope to open the veil a bit for these deceptively commonplace ideas by introducing a systematic way of understanding their profound influence on social behavior. This analysis begins with an exploration of what it means to think about different things from different perspectives in the course of social encounters. We then define several forms of social awareness–states of mind in which the person is consciously aware of a specific range of social experience from a specific point of view. After identifying some personal and situational antecedents of these forms, we turn finally to an outline of the crucial behavioral effects that can be traced to their variations.

Awareness of the Social World

When one is engaged in a social interaction, the array of things one might conceivably be thinking about seems almost limitless. On being stopped for a traffic violation by a police officer, for example, one might think about seeming irrelevancies ("Precious few bluejays out today"), or more likely, one would concentrate on the officer ("Those mirrored sunglasses are such a cliche"), oneself ("Does this mean I'm a criminal?"), the two together ("We're holding up traffic"), or yet other topics relevant to the episode. At the same time, the possible points of view one might entertain are many. Thinking about this interaction could be accomplished from one's own perspective ("Now I'll never get to the rodeo on time"), from the officer's ("My excuses must sound pretty common"), or even from the point of view of those outside the interaction ("The folks down at the insurance agency will love my larger premium checks"). Mercifully, however, it is also true that one cannot possibly think about all these things, or use all these perspectives, at the same time. The

many different ways of understanding the meaning of a social encounter can only occur to the person in a temporal succession.

Our analysis of social awareness is predicated on this idea, and on the additional realization that certain ways of understanding interactions may predominate for a person under certain circumstances. A form of social awareness, in this light, is a particular configuration of perception, interpretation, and memory that allows for a rather limited way of knowing the social environment. Although most people can adopt each of the possible awareness forms at different times, there are a number of instigating factors that can incline a person toward only a single form in a particular episode. It is easy to see in the case of the traffic violation, for instance, that one might spend a large part of the interaction thinking about the officer from one's own point of view ("This cop has the mind of a mossy rock"). Locked in this particular way of seeing the episode, one would naturally have a limited way of understanding what had occurred, and so would find only a restricted range of behavioral options appropriate as well.

The Tacit-Focal Distinction

As a first step in categorizing the social awareness forms available to the individual, it is useful to draw a general distinction between two ways in which social entities—self, individual others, or groups—may be represented in a person's thoughts. This distinction draws on one offered by the philosopher Polanyi (1966, 1969), and is a useful way of formalizing the difference between "topics of thought" and "perspectives on these topics" that we have emphasized to this point. Quite simply, when a social entity is a topic of a person's thought, we can speak of the person's *focal awareness* of the entity. When a social entity provides a perspective on a topic of thought, or otherwise serves as a cue or guide to that topic, we can speak of the person's *tacit awareness* of that entity. These two kinds of awareness have very different properties, and yet are highly interdependent as they operate to give the person access to the social world. Our initial description of these forms follows the extension of Polanyi's reasoning developed by Wegner (1982).

Focal awareness. When a person becomes focally aware of experience, a number of interesting things happen. At perhaps the most basic level, the target of focal awareness becomes "something." It is *constituted* as a unitary portion of experience and so can be seen as something different from other things. When we notice the ballerina who careens into the shrubbery during *Swan Lake*, for example, she suddenly becomes something, an item of experience that is clearly separate from everything else in the theater. And when our attention shifts to the starring dancer, to the dance troupe as a whole, or for that matter, to the time left before intermission, the clumsy ballerina recedes into the blurred background of our thoughts. Although she may be constituted once again when memories of her performance become focal, she is really nothing at all to us when our focal awareness dwells on other targets. In short, the extent to which an item of experience is constituted as a separate and bounded unit, be it a physical object, an event, a social entity, or yet something else, is dependent on the extent to which it is given focal awareness.

The second natural consequence of focal awareness is that the target is *comprehended.* The constituted object is made meaningful, in that it can be compared with other things, categorized, labeled, imaged, described, and otherwise understood. Something as meaning-laden as a hungry wolf licking one's hand, after all, will remain meaningless without one's focal awareness of the experience. Since there are degrees to which experience is given focal awareness, it is not surprising to find recent research suggesting that greater comprehension occurs with greater focal awareness. Langer's (1978) work on "mindfulness," for instance, finds greater attention to a situation leading (through increased comprehension) to more rational behavior. Taylor and Fiske's (1978) studies of attention indicate that increased focal awareness of a person results in an enhanced appreciation for the person's causal agency. And Pennebaker's (1980) research on symptom reporting reveals that attending to bodily sensations increases the likelihood that they will be comprehended as symptoms.

The third aspect of focal awareness we wish to emphasize is that it increases the likelihood that the target will be *evaluated.* Insofar as evaluation is the prime dimension of comprehension (Wegner & Vallacher, 1977), targets held in focal awareness are evaluated more intensely. Research by Tesser (1978) has shown that people who express a minimally positive or negative attitude toward some target regularly become more extreme in their evaluations of the target when they spend some time thinking about it more carefully. Wicklund (1975) has reviewed evidence in favor of a similar effect for self-awareness; when one becomes focally aware of oneself, the intensity of self-evaluation is increased. This feature of focal awareness specifies, quite simply, that villains we attend to become more dastardly, heroes we focalize become more admirable, delicacies we think about become more tempting, and poorly written sentences we read carefully become more annoying.

The reasoning thus far leads us to the conclusion that focal awareness is necessary for knowing the social world. It contributes directly to the constitution of distinguishable units of experience, to the clarity of comprehension of those units, and to the intensity of evaluation to which they are subject. Even so, we cannot help but wonder how these functions are guided and specified. We see people, not noses, strolling down the street; what guides us to constitute experience in units this particular way? We see taller and shorter people, not greener and bluer ones; what specifies that we comprehend them in this way? We prefer the smiling pedestrian, not the scowling one; why do we evaluate them so? Obviously, there is more to our minds than focal awareness alone. Polanyi (1966, 1969) has called this missing system "tacit knowledge" and has given some initial directions for understanding how it makes the human mind complete.

Tacit awareness. The idea that we can know things tacitly can be illustrated with a variety of common examples. When one examines an otherwise invisible organism with the aid of a microscope, for instance, it seems improper to say that one is looking *at* the microscope. Rather, one looks *through* the microscope. Though the microscope itself is not in focal awareness, it contributes in a crucial way to one's focal awareness of the organism. Similarly, when one converses on the telephone, it would

seem strange to say "I'm talking to the phone." The telephone system linking oneself and another party serves as a conduit through which one's focal awareness is directed, and through which an otherwise unattainable conversation can be carried on. And when one leaves the microscope in the lab and the phone in the office to spend some leisure hours fishing, one ends up becoming focally aware of the movements of a hook some yards beneath the water, again through a system—the pole and line—that need not be concentrated on at all. Of course, one could be focally aware of any of these objects. But paying close attention to a microscope leaves the microbe unobserved, listening to the phone leaves one's conversation partner unheeded, and concentrating on the pole makes one fail to notice the tugging of the fish. It is only when one is tacitly aware of these tools that one can become focally aware of the targets they afford.

William James once remarked that "the relation of knowing is the most mysterious thing in the world" (1890, p. 216). We believe Polanyi (1969) provided an important clue to this mystery when he pointed out that the person is tacitly aware of the sensation and interpretation systems of the body and mind. When we look *at* the microscope, for example, we are no longer tacitly aware of it, but we remain tacitly aware of our eyes, of the nerve structures that underlie their operation, and of the mental processes and structures by which the microscope is focally known. And, just as the microscope in tacit awareness allows us to constitute, comprehend, and even evaluate a microbe in focal awareness that we would otherwise never see, our minds in tacit awareness afford us the possibility of focal awareness of things in general. James' "relation of knowing," in this light, can be expressed as the relationship between tacit and focal awareness. In short, tacit awareness supplies the dimensions and metrics by which targets of focal awareness are known.

In a general sense, we are tacitly aware of anything that guides our focal awareness to something else. Wegner (1982) has used this idea to suggest that it is reasonable to speak of tacit awareness of social entities, and to use this language to systematize what we might call "perspectives," "interests," or "viewpoints" in everyday terms. Suppose, for instance, that we encounter a small girl standing on a sidewalk. We might at first become focally aware of her (as we did with the ballerina) and so constitute her ("here's something"), comprehend her ("a small child"), and evaluate her ("she's filthy"). But at some point we might also note that she is gazing down at the sidewalk. We follow her line of sight and discover a dropped ice cream cone. This very act of moving our focal awareness to coincide with hers makes us, however briefly, tacitly aware of her. For this instant, we may see her situation in focal awareness, with our machinery of constitution, comprehension, and evaluation guided entirely by tacit awareness of her. The melting cone becomes an ugly blot on our consciousness as we think about it from her point of view, and in this instant we may want very much to buy her a new one. Whether we do this hinges entirely on whether we remain in this form of awareness. We could, for example, focalize the child again ("not only filthy but clumsy"), or simply revert to tacit awareness of ourselves ("better not step in the mess"). There are a variety of different awareness forms we could assume in any such encounter, and it is to an enumeration of these that we turn next.

The Forms of Social Awareness

Each distinguishable form of social awareness can be specified in terms of two features: what is tacit and what is focal. In this sense, a form of social awareness is a kind of shorthand for representing a person's perspective and the person's topic of thought at once. To introduce these forms, we begin with the *primary* social awareness forms to show how each of the major social entities—self, other, and group—can be portrayed in either tacit or focal awareness. Then, several of the most commonly experienced *combined* forms will be presented.

Primary awareness forms. Several forms of social awareness represent recurrent themes both in social life and in the writings of social psychologists. These primary forms, which include both tacit and focal awareness of the self, a specific other, and a group, are presented in Table 6-1. As shown in the table, there is a unique combination of entities occupying tacit and focal awareness for each awareness form.

Tacit self awareness is the first and most basic awareness form. In this form the self serves as a window through which the world may be viewed. In looking outward this way, it is one's own situation that absorbs one's attention, and that is therefore the target of focal awareness. Examples of this state in its pure form occur when a person is working alone on a task that demands almost complete attention, e.g., a draftsman working on a final floor plan, a musician learning a new piece, or a student tackling a difficult calculus problem. Because tacit self awareness involves attention directed outward to tasks or the environment, this form resembles what James (1890) called the "self as knower," what Schutz (1932/1967) called the "natural attitude," what Mead (1934) called the "I," what those in the Lewinian tradition defined as "task orientation" (Lewis, 1944), and what Duval and Wicklund (1972) term "subjective self awareness." Because taking one's own perspective is an inevitable first step in becoming aware of anything else, tacit self awareness serves as the starting point for all other forms of awareness. This aspect of social aware-

Table 6 Primary Forms of Social Awareness

	Position of social entity	
Awareness form	Tacit	Focal
Tacit self awareness	Self	Self's situation
Focal self awarenes	Self	Self
Tacit other awareness	Self, other	Other's situation
Focal other awareness	Self	Other
Tacit group awareness	Self, group	Group's situation
Focal group awareness	Self	Group

ness is represented by the appearance of an initial tacit "self" in each of the tabled awareness forms.

The self remains tacit, for instance, even when one thinks directly about oneself in focal self awareness. But instead of viewing just any aspect of the world, in focal self awareness one reflects on oneself, a particular entity in that world. This reflective capacity has been identified previously in the history of social psychology as the "self as known" (James, 1890), the "social self" (Cooley, 1902), the "self-regarding sentiment" (McDougall, 1908), the "me" (Mead, 1934), and most recently, "objective self awareness" (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). The body of research generated by Duval and Wicklund's conceptualization of this awareness form suggests many examples of its occurrence in everyday life. When one's attention is drawn to oneself by exposure to one's mirror or video image, for instance, one focuses on self from one's own tacit perspective; this is the primary form of focal self awareness.

Tacit other awareness, the next tabled form, corresponds in important ways with "role-taking" (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968; Mead, 1934), "sympathy" (Cooley, 1902), and "empathy" (Stotland, 1969). In this form of awareness, tacit awareness of a specific other is appended to tacit awareness of self; thus, one may focalize aspects of the other's situation from the other's perspective. When our hands sweat as we watch our best friend give an important talk before a crowd, or when we get teary eyed at the movies as our favorite actress discovers that her lover fell down a well, we are putting ourselves in another's place to see how the world appears from his or her point of view. By contrast, in focal other awareness, one looks at someone through one's own (tacit self) perspective. We would, for example, stare and perhaps giggle at a business executive in a cafeteria who is blissfully ignorant of the display of food on his shirt, instead of trying to understand the other things he has to think about. This state, in which another person serves as the object of one's own focus, is reminiscent of Schutz's (1932/1967) "objectification," Jones and Thibaut's (1958) "value maintenance set," and Taylor and Fiske's (1978) "person salience."

The final two primary awareness forms extend the operation of tacit and focal awareness to a group, an aggregate of individuals perceived as a unitary social entity. Cooley's (1902) identification of the "we-feeling" was an early recognition of the state of mind one assumes in becoming aware of one's own group. That one's own and other groups might be seen as units was later suggested by Campbell (1958), Heider (1958), and others. And the distinction between groups seen as subjects and objects, one paralleling exactly our distinction between tacit and focal group awareness, has been made by Holzner (1978). In our view, regardless of whether one is a group member or not, a group can be the focus of one's attention (focal group awareness), or the guiding representation through which its situation is focalized (tacit group awareness). For example, a fan watching the halftime show at a football game could assume focal group awareness of the band, and so comment on its overall qualities. This awareness form would preclude for the moment focal awareness of any other entity, including the individuals in the band; therefore, the fan would not be likely to remark that John was out of step or Susie looked good in her tuba. Likewise, when the football coach is tacitly aware of his team in the second half

and yells "Go, team!" or "We only need forty points to win," he does so with the interests of the group in mind.

Combined awareness forms. Although the primary awareness forms provide a basic system of cognitive representation, these elements can be combined to yield an even wider range of ways to understand the social environment. For the primary awareness forms, the contents of tacit and focal awareness are summarized in Table 6-1. In expanding this system we move to a notation in which each combined form is specified by noting both the contents of tacit awareness and focal awareness (e.g., tacit other/focal self). Before we consider how awareness forms can be combined, however, certain defining characteristics should be noted. First, recall that all forms of social awareness begin with tacit self awareness. Second, tacit awareness of any number of ordered social entities may follow. Finally, the eventual focal target must either be a single social entity, or the situation of the most recent entity in tacit awareness. With these rules, the combinations of tacit and focal social entities can produce an endless array of potential awareness forms. We must caution, however, that the capacity of the human mind for tacit extension is limited. On entering a situation that leaves one thinking about what Lulu thinks about what Frieda thinks about what Elsie thinks about Duard, for example, it is likely one's judgments will be less than sensible. For this reason, we believe only a restricted set of potential combinations require description.

Among the most common types of combined forms of awareness are those that involve the self in a focal position. There are certain times when, apart from the primary form of focal self awareness in which self is also tacit, one may come to view oneself from the perspective of other entities. Similar in many respects to concerns for self-presentation or impression management (see Wegner, 1982), these combined forms predominate when one considers oneself from the perspective of another person (tacit other/focal self) or group (tacit group/focal self). One may wonder in tacit other/focal self awareness, for instance, what one's potential employer is thinking about the Mickey Mouse watch one is wearing. In tacit group/focal self awareness as a member of a basketball team, in turn, one might be concerned with how the team views one's two point season contribution. Being similarly capable of adopting tacit group/focal self awareness for a group to which one does not belong, one might also realize how valuable one's contribution might seem to each opposing team.

Combined awareness forms can also exist without the self in a focal position. In tacit other/focal group awareness, for example, one focalizes a group from the perspective of a person held in tacit awareness. This might be the state of mind of a teacher who takes a week leave of absence and tries to discern what the substitute will think of the class. Conversely, in tacit group/focal other awareness, the teacher might be concerned about how the class will view the substitute. This awareness of how one entity views another might also occur in perceiving the interaction between two individuals or two groups; seeing how one's mother views one's date, for instance, might be symbolized as tacit other (mom)/focal other (date) awareness; seeing how one's carload of high school compatriots is viewed on the town's main

drag by a carload of opposite-sexed cruisers could be accomplished in tacit group (them)/focal group (us) awareness. The ingroup/outgroup dichotomy familiar to social psychologists (see Brewer, 1979; Wilder & Cooper, 1981) would be likely when members of two groups each adopted tacit group (us)/focal group (them) awareness.

Finally, there can exist combined awareness forms in which one is aware of the same entity in tacit and focal awareness. Like the primary awareness form that has this feature—focal self awareness—the combined forms of this type seem to represent a kind of reflective awareness. In tacit other/focal other awareness, then, we see people as they see themselves, understanding their self-satisfactions and self-criticisms in a very personal way. We might note in passing that it seems particularly easy to become aware of adolescents in this way. Perhaps because of their especially telling symptoms of self-consciousness, we find equally contagious their exuberance over a passed exam and their mortification over the most recent facial blemish. In tacit group/focal group awareness, in turn, we are attuned to the manner in which a group views itself. Seeing the downcast looks on all the players of a losing hockey team, for instance, may lead us to recognize the group's self-evaluation more than the individual self-evaluations of any of the players.

In presenting these many examples of awareness forms in everyday life, we have tried to show how these forms of awareness can provide a rich representation of the social world. Although we realize that a system capable of such complexity carries the danger of becoming too unwieldy for proper scientific analysis, we wish to emphasize that this apparent complexity is effectively reduced in two ways. First, it is reduced on a practical level when we consider how these forms are actually used. As we see it, awareness forms are never simultaneously evoked, nor are all awareness forms necessarily available to the individual in any situation. Rather, the person typically adopts only a few forms of awareness in the confines of a particular episode, and even then may emphasize one at the expense of others. Complexity is reduced in a second way on the theoretical level. Each of the combined awareness forms, after all, can be understood in terms of the six primary forms, and all of these in turn can be summarized in terms of the simple distinction between tacit and focal awareness. Because this basic distinction is the key to our system, we now turn to a more detailed analysis of the different understandings of people that the partition entails.

The Representation of Persons in Thought

What does it mean to know a person or a group? We believe that radically different answers to this question are appropriate depending on whether one knows the social entity in tacit awareness or focal awareness. In tacit awareness, one knows an entity in what seems to be a very indirect way; the entity serves only as a template through which aspects of its situation may be interpreted and focalized. In focal awareness, one knows an entity more directly; it serves as an object of thought whose features and characteristics are identifiable. In both cases, however, it is sensible to argue that an observer who becomes aware of an entity uses some sort of mental representation of the entity in the enterprise of perceiving, storing, and retrieving information.

To distinguish between the kinds of representations that must be necessary to accommodate different forms of awareness, we will discuss in this section first the *transparent representation* of an entity held in tacit awareness, and then the *opaque representation* of an entity held in focal awareness. Each of these representations is a knowledge structure that has functions and properties consistent with its associated form of awareness. In turning to this language of "representation," it also becomes clear that knowledge of social entities exists in some interconnected network despite flux in the observer's social awareness. Changing our awareness of a person, for example, does not make us suddenly believe we are thinking about someone else. In the last part of this section, we will offer some ideas about how these different representations are linked into a unified body of social knowledge.

Transparent Representation

Imagine a couple who have each been given a pair of magic glasses—magic, in that each pair only shows things from the point of view of its owner. One evening, the couple exchanges glasses, and the male finds his way out of the living room and into the kitchen while seeing only his partner's view of the living room where she sits. The female, in turn, could sit comfortably in a chair and watch large items of furniture loom into view, a door appear and swing aside, and a low-hanging lamp in the kitchen grow larger and then bounce sharply away from a point just above the field of vision. The message of this example is that, while such glasses are not yet available, we each have transparent representations of others that can have a similar enlightening impact on our understanding.

General properties. A transparent representation of an entity is a store of knowledge about how the entity's environment should be focalized. It contributes in an important way to the constitution of focal targets, for example, by alerting us to those targets that are likely to be selected by the entity; so, when we observe someone shopping for a gift to be given to a female, our transparent representation of the shopper leads us to attend primarily to appropriate female gifts (Zadny & Gerard, 1974). Similarly, a transparent representation guides our comprehension of the environment by leading us to understand and thus remember the events and objects that would be meaningful to the represented entity. Thus, when we read a story about an island from the perspective of a shipwrecked person, we understand and remember a very different set of story ideas than when we read it from the perspective of a florist who wants an out-of-the-way place to raise flowers (Pichert & Anderson, 1977). Indeed, a transparent representation even guides comprehension of information that is stored in our own memories. Asked to recall a story from one perspective, when we previously read it using another, we may be able to recall facts and ideas relevant to the new perspective that we otherwise would have been unable to report (Anderson & Pichert, 1978).

The influence of a transparent representation that may be most significant in social interaction, however, is its power to change our evaluation of the environment. With a transparent representation, we assign valences to objects and events in accord

with the perceived preferences of the represented entity. In this way, we become especially sensitive to the entity's future. After all, in assigning labels of "good" and "bad" to the environment in accord with the entity, we are expressing the entity's goals (good things to be approached, bad things to be avoided), plans (good means for goal attainment), and problems (bad things to be made good). The transparent representation of a used car buyer, for instance, makes observers emphasize the goal of finding a low-priced car, whereas such representation of the seller makes observers more appreciative of high prices (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979). So, while we would identify as general properties of transparent representations their guiding influences on constitution, comprehension, and evaluation, we wish to stress their evaluative impact.

Memory for goals. We believe that this evaluative impact of transparent representations is most clearly manifested in their tendency to enhance memory for an entity's goals. An excellent illustration of this point was provided in early research by Lewis (1944) and Lewis and Franklin (1944). These investigators were interested in the Zeigarnik effect–the tendency of a person to remember unachieved goals better than achieved goals. In an initial study, precisely this effect was found; when subjects worked alone on 18 different tasks, half of which they finished and half of which were interrupted, they later recalled more of the incomplete tasks. When these researchers arranged for an antagonistic experimenter to complete in the subject's presence those tasks the subject did not finish, this effect was again observed. However, subjects in a third group were exposed to an experimental situation we believe would induce tacit group awareness, and hence, transparent representation of the group rather than the self; each of these subjects worked with a cooperative partner who finished the tasks the subject had left undone. With the *group's* goals accomplished, subjects recalled complete and incomplete tasks equally. These findings show that transparent representations may have a substantial influence on goal memory.

Recent research points to a similar conclusion. In a study using a technique developed by Bower (1978), we induced the transparent representation of different social entities in a story by having subjects see different versions of the story's first paragraph (Wegner & Giuliano, 1981). This initial introduction of a "point of view" featured an entity (i.e., one girl, a pair of girls including the first, or a third girl) setting off for a shopping mall, and was followed by a standard 537-word story about all three girls spending the afternoon shopping. We found that subjects were more likely later to recognize the goals expressed in the story that were those of their transparently represented entity. So, for example, if the story began with the group (Janet and Susie), subjects were more inclined later to remember the group's common goals (e.g., Janet and Susie both wanted to get salads for lunch). This finding is consistent with a growing body of research on story comprehension that points to the fundamental role of goal understanding in the comprehension of action. In fact, Bower (1978) has found that observers who read a story in which the main character's goals are obscure will judge the story to be incoherent and recall it poorly. Without goal information, a transparent representation is impoverished.

The feature of transparent representation we wish to emphasize, in sum, is that it functions to facilitate the processing of information about an entity's goals. Goal

information is sought, stored, and retrieved most readily when transparent representation is activated. Such information is relatively unavailable, however, given opaque representation of an entity.

Opaque Representation

Imagine now that our couple agrees to try some "new, improved" magic glasses, ones through which each can only see the other. The male again wanders from the living room, this time able to look only at the female; the female again sits in a chair, now able to see the male at all times. Wary of the lamp, the male removes his glasses as he enters the kitchen. He notes that the room is already occupied by a bear, and then explodes into a frenzy of arm waving, eye rolling, and cabinet climbing. Because the female can only see him, and not the bear, she understandably concludes that he has gone mad. This example shows that an observer's interpretation of a person may be developed in a very special, limited way when an opaque representation, like these magic glasses, is brought to bear.

General properties. An opaque representation of an entity is a store of knowledge about how the entity should be focalized. Its most basic function is constituting the entity as a distinct unit of experience. In service of this goal, any differences between the entity and other experience are exaggerated, while differences among various properties, aspects, or subparts of the entity itself are underestimated. This feature of opaque representation is perhaps most evident in the perception of groups. In the typical ingroup/outgroup situation, for example, an ingroup member would be most likely to focalize the outgroup; hence, the difference between the outgroup and the general population is exaggerated (Wilder & Cooper, 1981), and the differences among outgroup members are minimized (Quattrone & Jones, 1980). This press toward seeing the focal entity as a distinct unit is evident in the perception of an individual as well. Ickes, Layden, and Barnes (1978), for example, found that self-focused attention made individuals more likely to describe themselves in "individuated" terms, while Vallacher (1978) found that increased attention to others led observers to make more fine discriminations among them.

Opaque representations lead us to comprehend entities by characterizing them. We look for their most permanent, unique, and characteristic qualities, and search for these primarily by considering the entity's past. An entity's future, after all, is but an uncertain construction, and most goals that an entity may profess are not especially unique (Worchel & Andreoli, 1978) or permanent. Trying to find the one person who wants a hot dog in a ballpark, for example, would often lead to the selection of several hundred fans, and the composition of this crowd would even tend to differ from one moment to the next. It is for this reason that opaque representation of an entity guides us to become naive "trait" theorists, searching for the enduring dispositions of the entity by generalizing from instances of behavior and appearance in the past. With greater focalization of an entity, then, we become more likely to believe that the entity possesses some previously observed characteristic (Strack, Erber, & Wicklund, 1980).

When our tacit perspective sets us to evaluate an entity in some way, our opaque representation of the entity supplies a structure for perceiving the entity as good or bad. The evaluation of an entity regularly becomes more extreme with greater focal awareness of the entity (Eisen & McArthur, 1979; McArthur & Solomon, 1978; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978) because opaque representation is a knowledge structure within which such extremity is fostered. Now, the development and maintenance of any extreme position is no simple matter. A person who wanted, for example, to hold the strong belief that sneezing causes instant death would be forced to ignore observed facts, invent unobserved supportive information, reinterpret neutral information in the right way, and so on. An opaque representation of an entity is saddled with precisely these kinds of tasks; in this sense, it can be said that opaque representations are the source of the well-known halo effect in person perception. The tendency to see an entity as all good or all bad, and the accompanying thought structures that distort understanding in service of producing such extremity are necessarily components of opaque representation.

Memory for characteristics. The contemporary study of the perception of persons and groups is, in large part, the study of opaque representation. In such research, psychologists typically present observers with a stimulus person or group, ask the observers to describe or evaluate the stimulus in some way, and then concentrate on the properties of this description or evaluation. Under these conditions, the entity being perceived is of course an object of sustained focal awareness, and the properties of social perception discerned in this fashion are those of opaque representation. Although this broad background suggests many potentially interesting features of opaque representation, we believe that one such feature, memory for characteristics, deserves emphasis because of the strong contrast it suggests between opaque representation and transparent representation.

Our point is that opaque representations, unlike transparent representations, are particularly inclined to promote memory for an entity's characteristics. Because characteristics do not include goals or other temporary states, but do include the lasting and distinctive qualities of persons such as traits and physical features, it is possible to draw a clear distinction between the influences of the different kinds of representation on memory. The "shopping spree" story comprehension study by Wegner and Giuliano (1981) yielded findings highly relevant to this distinction. As mentioned earlier, subjects in this study were assigned to one of three different conditions, each designed to induce transparent representation of a particular social entity. What we failed to mention earlier was that these variations were also planned as subtle manipulations of opaque representation. We reasoned that just as taking one side in a dispute necessarily entails opposing the other, taking the perspective of one entity in this story would increase the likelihood that other entities would be focalized. Since this effect would be particularly discernible in the case of only two entities, we paid special attention to the conditions in which transparent representation of one entity in the story (i.e., either Ellen or the group comprised of Janet and Susie) would leave only one other entity to be remembered (i.e., the group or Ellen). In these conditions, subjects' memory for the characteristics of the

complementary entity was enhanced. So, for instance, subjects who took the tacit perspective of Ellen were later more likely to recognize those common characteristics of Janet and Susie that were expressed in the story (e.g., Janet and Susie both had long hair and both were cheerleaders, etc.).

This study indicates that in understanding a simple story, we do not only look for a character's goals. Although we do this for at least one main character, such transparent representation leads us to adopt opaque representations of other entities, and so to remember their characteristics. To a large extent, this is also how we understand the characters in our own life stories.

The Structure and Interaction of Representations

In the attempt to draw the distinction between the transparent and opaque representation of an entity as clearly as possible, we have avoided until now discussion of the connection between these representations. Certainly, however, there must be a profound connection; even though transparent and opaque representations may move us to understand an entity in very different ways, there is still no question in our minds that it is the same entity. This connection can be traced to two sources. First, transparent and opaque representations are linked because they operate from the same knowledge base. Second, transparent and opaque representations of an entity may inform each other from time to time, allowing certain kinds of information to be transferred between them.

The idea that the two representations of an entity may function from the same knowledge base is evident when we consider perceptions of action. Suppose we are told, for instance, that Flo ate a turnip. This is not preinterpreted information about Flo's goals or characteristics such as the information subjects were presented in our shopping spree study. It is merely a record of action. From this same knowledge base, a transparent representation of Flo might lead us to interpret the act as an expression of her goal ("Flo wanted a turnip"), whereas an opaque representation of her would guide us to interpret the act as a manifestation of her character ("Flo is a turnip-eater"). Just as the perpetrator of an act is likely to emphasize intention in explaining it, whereas an observer of the act is more inclined to stress the permanent traits of the actor that may have caused it (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Passer, Kelley, & Michela, 1978), transparent and opaque representations activate these different ways of interpreting an entity's behavior. So, to the extent that the same behavioral knowledge base is available as input to both kinds of representation ("Flo ate that turnip, no matter why"), the representations are connected at a very fundamental level.

The second source of connection between the two representations is evident when we consider their use in ongoing interaction. Suppose, for instance, that one comprehends a person in focal awareness, and guided by the rules of opaque representation, one interprets and stores the person's behavior—holding up a filling station—as a characteristic. The person is thought of as a thief. Now, suppose one meets the person again, this time under conditions conducive to transparent representation (e.g., one is appointed the person's attorney). It seems that the opaque representation might inform the transparent representation about this person. The

label of "thief" might be used to generate inferences about the person's goals quite directly (e.g., thieves want money, so the person wanted money), or it might provide access to the original action description (e.g., the person held up a filling station), and so to potential goal inferences.

In many cases, however, the transfer of information from one representation to the other is difficult or impossible because the two representations organize the information in incompatible ways. Several different instances of a person's behavior, for example, might all be organized in an opaque representation in terms of their relevance to a single characteristic; falling out of a car, tripping on a carpet, and slipping on a diving board might all be seen as instances of a person's clumsiness. These individual instances might only be retrievable to the degree that the "clumsy" characteristic is itself available. If the observer now turns to tacit awareness of this person and is asked to discern, say, what the person might like to do on a summer vacation, the opaque representation could be useless as a way of finding an answer. Although the diving board incident provides a hint that the person might want to go swimming, this behavioral information is inaccessible for representation as a summer vacation goal because it is organized with, and only accessible via, the characteristic of clumsiness. Unless we mention clumsiness in our question about the vacation goal, the answer will not be retrieved. As Hoffman, Mischel, and Mazze (1981) have shown, the characteristic- and goal-based organizations of behavioral information that arise as a result of different awareness forms can lead to variation in memory for instances of behavior. It is for this reason that transparent and opaque representations of an entity may lead somewhat independent existences, each fairly uninformed of information held in the other.

Although we have stopped far short of developing a detailed structural model of the cognitive representation of social entities, our brief discussion in this section suggests the form such a model might take. We hold that transparent and opaque representations are very different ways of organizing information in memory. In opaque representation, information is linked together in terms of characteristics of the entity, and these characteristics may in turn be linked in a network resembling an "implicit personality theory" structure. In transparent representation, information is linked together by virtue of its association with goals of the entity, and these goals may in turn be linked in a network resembling a "script" (cf. Schank & Abelson, 1977), or more generally, an "implicit situation theory" (cf. Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). These different organizations of information afford the person the possibility of understanding the entity differently in focal and tacit awareness.

The Instigation of Awareness Forms

Awareness forms and their associated representations of social entities do not, like sugar plums, merely dance in the person's head. Rather, their occurrence and change can be traced to a set of personal and situational instigators that are fairly well circumscribed. In this section, we outline the operation of three broad categories of instigation.

Attentional Instigation

The nature of our perceptual engagement with the environment can promote different forms of social awareness in two major ways. First, certain targets of focal awareness may be more salient or attention-seizing than others; *target salience* may lead us to hold a target in focal awareness and adopt the tacit perspective most suitable for understanding it. Second, certain targets of focal awareness may only be salient in a transitional sense; their *cue value* quickly leads our attention elsewhere, leaving us tacitly aware of them and in search of their focal target.

Target salience. When something in our environment draws our attention, it becomes at least temporarily the target of our focal awareness. Focal awareness of self, other, or group would result, then, when such an entity is a salient target. Tacit awareness of one of these entities could often occur, in turn, when something in its situation is a salient target. These rules relating attention and awareness forms have been implicit in much of our discussion to this point, and so should be relatively straightforward. The situational and personal factors that underlie target salience, however, deserve some additional consideration.

As a rule, situational stimuli are salient and draw our attention to the extent that they are distinctive. It is not uncommon, for example, to turn our attention to the lone female on a Little League team, or to the single drummer who turns left as the band turns right. Distinctiveness seems to be a key factor in the Gestalt principles of attention (Koffka, 1935), such that objects or persons made distinct through brightness, movement, complexity, novelty, and the like, have been found to attract attention (see Duval & Hensley, 1976; Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Wegner & Schaefer, 1978). Each of these different qualities of stimulation functions to make the target figural against the ground of other experience.

In the course of research on such salience, a variety of situational manipulations have been used. Seeing oneself in a mirror, hearing one's own tape-recorded voice, or being reminded of one's uniqueness are some of the ways the self has been made salient in inducing focal self awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). Similarly, the simultaneous placement of two or more people in front of a mirror has produced focal group awareness in these individuals (Giuliano & Wegner, 1981; Pennebaker, McElrea, & Skelton, 1979). Focal and tacit other awareness can be induced through situational manipulations of salience as well. Using videotape and special camera angles, researchers have made a person salient by showing observers only the person's face, and have made the person's situation salient by showing observers a tape made from a point above and behind the person's shoulder (Storms, 1973; Taylor & Fiske, 1978).

The salience of a target can also be measured as it is reflected in the perceiver's state of mind. Since thoughts about a salient target are likely to be readily available (Pryor & Kriss, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), one way to measure what is salient for people is to tap directly into what they are thinking about. This can be accomplished through thought sampling, a method developed to study the stream of consciousness (Klinger, 1978). When people report their most available ongoing thoughts, it is likely that the target of their focal awareness—whatever is most

salient—will be revealed. One approach to thought sampling has been to present subjects with a series of incomplete sentences and to have them fill in what they believe are appropriate pronouns (Davis & Brock, 1975; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). Since in no case is one pronoun more "right" than another, frequent use of a particular type of pronoun can be taken as an indicator of the salience of the particular entity to which it applies. This means, then, that a person who chooses to use a majority of first person singular pronouns (i.e., I, me, my) in completing sentences is apt to be focally aware of the self, whereas a person using more first person plural pronouns (i.e., we, us, our) is focally aware of a group comprised of self and others (Giuliano & Wegner, 1981). Although the thought sampling techniques presented here are useful for determining focal targets, they offer no information about tacit awareness. It is possible, however, given more complex verbal productions than pronouns, that tacit perspectives might be able to be tapped as well.

As our thoughts are constantly changing, these thought sampling techniques measure "states," and are most useful as current, momentary indicators of salience. In some cases, however, the salience of a target may be considered a "trait" rather than a "state" of the perceiver. People may have propensities to focus on certain things, and they can report those things they typically think about in the same way they can report what is currently in their thoughts. Personality psychologists have taken advantage of this self-report capability and have developed certain personality measures that are useful for determining individual differences in salience. Individual differences in public and private self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), for example, suggest that for individuals high in either of these traits, the self will be salient, and there will be a tendency to engage in focal self awareness. Unfortunately, since it has not yet been determined whether there are reliable individual differences that result in salience of other entities or situations, we are limited in exploring further the relationship between social awareness and attention-related personality variables.

The final point we wish to make about target salience is that in focusing on whatever target is salient, the perceiver may encounter an interpretive dilemma. Although a target may be salient to a particular tacit perspective, it may not be as clearly interpretable from that point of view as it would be from another. While we often revert to our own tacit perspective under these circumstances, this can be inappropriate at times when the target is noticeable yet meaningless to the tacit self. For clarity, we may search for a tacit perspective that will help us understand the salient target (cf. Schachter, 1959). Before calling for help as a wild man runs toward us with arms flapping, for instance, we might look to the friend walking with us to see if he is offering a similarly embarrassing greeting. Looking through a tacit entity at an ambiguous target provides us with a different and often informative way of interpreting the target. For this reason, as we note next, target salience is regularly accompanied by the cue value of targets as a determinant of our awareness form.

Cue value. When something in our environment does not draw attention to itself, but rather directs our attention to something else, it serves as a cue for focal awareness. If this cue is provided by a social entity, we shift from focal to tacit awareness of it, and subsequently focalize whatever the entity is leading our attention toward.

As an illustration of this, suppose that Wally is sitting on the couch with three friends. If all three simultaneously jump up and dart toward the window, we can expect Wally not to remain seated staring at them for long, but soon to be looking right along with them. With only the vaguest idea of what the proper target of focal awareness might be, Wally moves to seek that target. In general, we can define a social entity's propensity to guide a person's focal awareness in this way as the entity's cue value for the person.

A social entity is likely to have high cue value when what is focal for that entity is potentially of interest or relevance to the perceiver's tacit self, for it is under such circumstances that becoming tacitly aware of another entity might prove useful. When the social entity being focalized is an individual, there are four classes of behavioral evidence the entity might display that would contribute to its cue value. A person may attract our attention to something in his or her focus through verbalization ("Watch out!"), through nonverbal gestures signifying orientation (staring, sniffing, etc.), through facial or bodily emotional expression (moaning, laughing, etc.), or through target-directed action (pointing, throwing a spear, rolling a bowling ball, etc.). The cue value of the individual is enhanced with more obvious display of such behaviors because the individual's focal target is seen as more important to the perceiver's tacit self. The more urgent a verbalization, the more intent an orientation, the more extreme an emotional expression, or the more vigorous an action, the greater the likelihood the perceiver will move focal awareness away from the behaving individual and toward the seemingly important new target. At a crowded social gathering, after all, one is more likely to search for the focal target of someone yelling "Fire!" than of someone mumbling into a basket of fruit.

The four kinds of behavioral evidence are also likely to increase the cue value of a group we are focalizing, but there are additional features of groups that can affect their cue value (cf. Wilder & Cooper, 1981). Suppose we see a group of people, all of whom are running and pointing in different directions. Because of the confusion, no matter how urgent or threatening we perceive the situation to be, we may never take the appropriate tacit perspective to understand their agitation. For a group to have high cue value, its behavioral evidence of the appropriate focal target must show some degree of unanimity. This unanimity not only increases the likelihood a group of persons will be seen as a single social entity and not as individuals, it also increases the chance that a group with a common target will convey its message. Beyond unanimity, we can also note that the larger the group focalizing a single target, the greater the group's cue value. Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowitz (1969) made this point in a study by arranging for crowds of different sizes to gaze upward from a city sidewalk. Passers-by more often looked up in the presence of larger groups.

The cue value of a social entity acts as a sort of "shield" by which our focal awareness is deflected. But in the very act of moving to the cued target, we become aware of the entity in a tacit fashion. The question of whether we remain tacitly aware of the social entity for some time thereafter, or move immediately back to our own tacit perspective, is then determined by the relative clarity and usefulness of the different perspectives. If the cued target has immediate and profound meaning for us (a falling piano), we revert to tacit self awareness and comprehend it for ourselves. However, if the cued target has greater meaning for the entity that led us

to perceive it initially (a piano falling toward them), we may continue in tacit awareness of that entity and may even respond to the entity's situation in a way that would satisfy the entity's goals (take instrumental action to move the entity).

Just as for some people there is a tendency for certain targets to be salient in focal awareness, for some people there is a tendency for the cue value of some entities to be greater than that of others. Reliable individual differences in empathy, for example, suggest people differ in the extent they can and will adopt a tacit other or tacit group perspective (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). Those high in empathy may be more sensitive to the cue value of others in general, as well as being more likely to remain in tacit awareness once a perspective is adopted. In a similar way, although the dimensions of private and public self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975) both imply the same focus of attention, the self, it could be that the distinction between them lies in the cues that lead to this focus. For persons high in public self-consciousness, it may be the cues provided by others or groups (such as audiences) that direct attention toward the self; for persons high in private self-consciousness, the cues directing attention toward the self may be provided by the tacit self alone.

Affective Instigation

We begin the journey to different forms of social awareness in what phenomenologists (e.g., Schutz, 1932/1967) call the "natural attitude"—tacit self awareness. For this reason, the goals, interests, standards, and evaluative tendencies of the tacit self are paramount in the determination of the particular awareness form we may next assume. This important instigational influence can be conceptualized in terms of two general kinds of effects. First, *evaluation effects* on social awareness occur when the individual adopts an awareness form as a result of the way a social entity is evaluated in focal awareness. Second, *mood effects* are observed when the individual adopts an awareness form as a result of his or her own mood. In both cases, a person may exhibit more or less affinity for a particular awareness form through variations in affective instigation.

Evaluation effects. In the state of tacit self awareness, we encounter various social entities and focalize them in turn, discerning their characteristics and judging them to be good or bad for us. We may base our evaluative judgments on characteristics as important as the entity's competence or morality (Vallacher, 1980), or on characteristics as seemingly insignificant as the entity's favorite cheese. We may even base our evaluation on simple familiarity, without benefit of knowing the entity's specific characteristics at all (Zajonc, 1980). But the evaluation we reach is crucial, for it then determines the form of awareness we are most likely to adopt with respect to the entity, and so defines the ways we will understand the entity in the future.

The negative evaluation of an entity in focal awareness leads to a continued propensity to hold the entity in focal awareness. Graziano, Brothen, and Berscheid (1980) made this point quite clearly in finding that subjects were more likely to

turn on a video monitor to view a person who had been negative toward them than to watch a person who had been positive. The point was made in another way in earlier research showing that observers are more likely to make precise and discriminating characterizations of people they dislike than of people they like (e.g., Irwin, Tripodi, & Bieri, 1967). In essence, what this means is that we are inclined to hold enemies "frozen" in focal awareness, and so to see them rather inflexibly as problems to be dealt with each time they impinge on our consciousness. This is not to say, however, that we spend large portions of our time each day seeking out and focalizing negative entities. As a rule, the realization that some entity is negative leads us to avoid the entity. This strategy of avoidance ensures that in the long run we will only infrequently hold the entity in *any* form of awareness.

The positive evaluation of an entity in focal awareness introduces a tendency to hold the entity in tacit awareness. So, while there is a general inclination to focalize any entity that has potential importance to the tacit self (Berscheid & Graziano, 1979), this inclination can often be set aside when the entity is seen as positive in value for the self. In essence, this transition represents an extension and refinement of the tacit self's own goals. Beginning with the simple goal of keeping the positive focal entity present, the tacit self engages tacit awareness of the entity and thereby encounters new goals to be attained. This transition is commonly known as "identification." When it happens, we come to see the world from the entity's perspective, and for this reason, may find ourselves in a self-perpetuating system. Tacit awareness of liked others or groups makes it unlikely that we will process their behavior in a way that would detract from our initial positive evaluation of them (Regan, Straus, & Fazio, 1974).

Now, under certain conditions, the positive evaluation of an entity in focal awareness may have yet another effect on our subsequent awareness form. If there is a way to become tacitly aware of a group that is comprised of both the entity and ourselves, we may do so. Although this may be decidedly difficult for us in the case of admired movie stars, heroes and heroines we learn to adore at a distance, or other unrequited loves, in those instances in which some grouping principle is available, our natural next step is to see the valued entity and ourselves as *us*. A good example of this is shown in studies of football fans by Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, and Freeman (1976). These researchers found that while fans of a losing team were likely to say that *they* lost, fans of a winning team tended to say that *we* won. Fans of losers saw them negatively, and so focalized the team. Fans of winners, however, saw them positively, and so took the opportunity to include themselves and the team in a larger group—"our side."

Finally, we should note that these differential effects of positive and negative evaluation have some intriguing consequences for one's awareness of oneself. On committing some error that leaves one's self-evaluation negative, the tendency to focus on negative entities that cannot be avoided should ensure that focal self awareness is prolonged. The joke that bombs before an audience, for example, can leave one feeling self-conscious into the wee hours of the night. On attaining some success that renders one's self-evaluation positive, in turn, tendencies toward focal self awareness would be relatively short-lived and one would more often revert to tacit

self awareness. The joke that makes the audience giggle provides a moment for self-congratulation that lasts only until the giggling stops. This evaluative asymmetry in the duration of self-focus has been documented by Wicklund (1975), and is also reflected in the finding that low self-esteem persons tend toward greater chronic self-consciousness (Brockner, 1979).

Mood effects. A somewhat more subtle form of affective instigation involves the impact of the perceiver's current mood on social awareness. As a way of understanding such instigation, it is useful first to note that as a general rule the target of focal awareness tends to "absorb" the affective tone of the perceiver's mood. Either by searching for negative items in memory and experience, or by interpreting neutral items in a negative way, a person in a bad mood or depressive state ultimately focuses on negative targets (Beck, 1976); a person in a good mood focuses on positive targets by the same token (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). This effect extends into focal awareness of persons in an interesting way. Enzle and Harvey (1978) found that observers in a good mood who focalize a person interpret the person's good behavior as a reflection of his or her personal characteristics; paralleling this, grumpy observers are more likely to see a focal target's bad behavior as a sign of his or her personal characteristics. Had observers in this study been tacitly aware of these persons, we would have expected a quite different effect. In focalizing a person's situation, the mood absorption rule would suggest that a sullen observer would see bad behavior as a characteristic of the situation, and that a light-hearted observer would see good behavior as situationally induced.

Because of the connection between one's mood and one's evaluation of focal targets, tacit awareness of others can be a tricky business. There is something highly disturbing, for example, about being in a bad mood and having a well-meaning friend drop by to talk about sunshine, flowers, and baby ducks. The friend's view of things seems especially foreign. And on the day we feel on top of the world, a chat with a gloomy neighbor about her collection of cancer-causing agents is similarly hard to bear. When we are experiencing a strong mood state, we typically find it easier to attain tacit awareness of entities exhibiting the same state because their evaluation of focal targets often coincides with ours. Bower (1978) has shown this in a story comprehension study; subjects who, through posthypnotic induction, shared the mood of a particular story character were more likely to adopt that character's point of view in remembering the story.

Symbolic Instigation

There are names for awareness forms in everyday language. Just as a person may label states of mind such as emotions or mood, talk about them with others, and understand what others mean when they convey their own moods in return, the person can symbolize, communicate, and understand the social awareness forms of self and others. This symbolizing capacity provides a means by which awareness forms may be instigated. At the most basic level, awareness forms may be instigated by *direct solicitation*; everyday requests to "look at this" or to "take my point of view" can produce particular forms of awareness. At more complex levels, awareness forms may be instigated by broader, more encompassing symbols that call for the adoption of norms, roles, or scripts; requests to follow a norm, adopt a role, or play out an interaction script suggest not only a range of appropriate behavior but a set of appropriate awareness forms as well.

Direct solicitation. States of mind are not entirely in our control. Although we may want very much to dispel a negative mood state, for example, and may engage in a variety of strategic activities to further this end, there is still a certain "automatic" quality to the mood that can resist our control attempts (cf. Clark & Isen, 1981). In the same way, attempts to change our own forms of social awareness may be thwarted by the "automatic" imposition of the awareness form that is most naturally instigated by our perceptual and affective systems. When these perceptual and affective forces are weak, however, and when we are at the same time in a position to attain the goals of the tacit self by choosing to engage a form of awareness, we may be responsive to direct requests for such change.

The assumption that people are responsive to the solicitation of awareness forms underlies much previous research. The studies following the Stotland (1969) tradition of empathy research, for example, have regularly used instructional sets calling for empathy, and so for tacit other awareness. In such instructions, both the appropriate tacit stance (the other's) and the appropriate focal target (the other's situation) are described in detail. In everyday interaction, there exists a similar though much abbreviated parlance that serves the same purpose. A person who is failing to empathize with another, for instance, may be told that he or she is being "judgmental," and may be asked to "take my perspective," "step into my shoes," or "think how I must feel." Each of the other forms of awareness similarly has common language labels that are used to symbolize it, and so to call it forth or send it away. Tacit group awareness is called for when the cheerleader asks the crowd "Where's your pep?"; focal group awareness is summoned when a citizen points to the group of youths down on the corner, saying "Just look at those hoodlums"; focal self awareness is warded off when the piano teacher tells the nervous young performer to "Forget about the audience—pretend you're playing alone at home." Every persuasion attempt, every appeal to join a cause, every admonition to attend or to think in one way or another asks us to change our state of social awareness. The direct solicitation of awareness forms is an integral part of symbolic interaction in daily life.

To some appreciable extent, then, such calls must work. We can control our forms of awareness through some sort of metacognitive system that allows us to respond to symbolic communication about them. And, given this socially derived symbolic system for thinking about our awareness forms, it is also likely that we may engage in some conscious control of awareness forms without external solicitation. Although it is difficult to judge what proportion of the variation in an individual's awareness forms might be accounted for by such self-regulation, it is easy to think of examples in which conscious control can produce social awareness changes. On finding oneself becoming too extreme in derogating some unfortunate

person or group, for instance, one may want to balance this extremity by spending a moment thinking about "What if it were me?" One may even consciously manipulate certain perceptual or affective instigators as a means of modifying a form of awareness ("Turn down the house lights so I can't see the audience").

Whether we change awareness forms in response to solicitation from others or in response to our own self-control concerns, however, it is clear that we can do so only because we have a commonsense language in which these states of mind can be symbolized (cf. Wegner & Vallacher, 1981). Direct solicitations of awareness forms may occur by means of symbols that are easily translated into the scientific language of social awareness (e.g., "focus," "perspective," etc.), or may occur by symbols that are far more obscure (e.g., "Where's your pep?"). But the fact that we can symbolize and communicate about these things affords us some opportunity of controlling them both in others and in ourselves.

Norms, roles, and scripts. Social psychologists have traditionally found the concepts of norm and role to be useful in summarizing ranges of social behavior; a norm summarizes a set of behaviors all people or all group members are likely to enact in a given setting, whereas a role summarizes a set of behaviors a person is likely to enact in a particular social position in a group (e.g., Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The more recent terminology of "scripts" serves a similar function; a script summarizes the sequence of behaviors that comprise a complex action or interaction of some duration (Schank & Abelson, 1977). The common feature of these three social psychological concepts, then, is that they each suggest a way in which the wide array of potential social behaviors may be restricted to a certain subset. We believe that behavior is often guided and restricted by norms, roles, and scripts through a process of symbolic instigation of awareness forms.

People use terms or phrases that can be classified as norms ("help the needy"), roles ("wife"), or scripts ("going to a restaurant") with great regularity in ordinary discourse. These social psychological concepts are part of the common language by which laypersons symbolize and communicate about the social world. We believe that just as a person may learn to adopt a form of social awareness in response to direct solicitation ("look here!"), people come to know that symbols of norms, roles, and scripts entail certain associated awareness forms. After years of watching people in action, the translation of these broad symbols into their more direct counterparts becomes a simple matter. So, on being asked to follow a norm such as "wipe your feet before coming inside," one may fairly automatically adopt tacit other/focal self awareness to see if one's feet are suitably wiped for the norm-giver. On being asked to adopt the role of judge for a beauty contest, one is likely to understand the necessity of focalizing each contestant in turn. And on being asked to "buy a carton of milk," one will typically begin with tacit self awareness in search of the store, move to tacit other awareness of the clerk as one assembles payment, and so on, engaging in a sequence of awareness forms in line with the milk-buying script. Without at least an elementary knowledge of the awareness forms associated with a norm, role, or script, one cannot respond to such a symbol at all. For this reason, the process of training people to respond to these complex symbols often involves much direct solicitation of appropriate awareness forms.

As a final note, we should point out that not all norms, roles, or scripts act as symbolic instigators of awareness forms. Obviously, this is true in cases when a person does not know the forms of awareness associated with a symbol. But it is also true in cases when a person's awareness form is already determined by attentional and affective factors, without any reference to a symbol. A young human playing what we might call the role of "child," for example, probably does not do so because he or she is asked to adhere to this symbolic representation. Rather, attentional and affective factors inherent in the child's environment come together to determine the child's forms of awareness. To some degree, this must also be true of an adult playing the role of "parent." It is only when a person makes the choice to adopt a symbol of this sort that we can say the person's awareness form is a result of symbolic instigation.

The Social Consequences of Awareness Forms

The most dangerous feature of any cognitive analysis of human behavior is that it has the capacity to gather sufficient momentum to break all but the most superficial ties with the behaviors and relationships of daily life. In fashioning the present analysis, we have been deeply concerned with counteracting this tendency by showing how the awareness forms are implicated in everyday behavior. One way of exploring this connection has been reported by Wegner (1982). In that analysis, evidence was assembled indicating that the awareness forms serve as important antecedents of a variety of justice-related behaviors. Tacit self awareness was found to portend self-interest; tacit other awareness was identified as a cause of need-based allocation to others; focal awareness of self and other were shown to predict concern for equity in distribution to each; and the forms of group awareness were found to predict equal allocation among group members. In this final section, we hope to show the usefulness of a social awareness analysis to realms of social behavior beyond those linked to justice. We examine first the implications of social awareness for behaviors associated with interpersonal influence, and then move to a consideration of how social awareness may be used to understand the intricacies of intimate relationships.

Influence

One of the major tenets of social psychology is that people can be influenced by others to behave in ways they otherwise would not. At the most rudimentary level, influence may occur when one person's behavior has a physical impact on that of another, e.g., Person A decks Person B with a rabbit punch. But such physical influence is not commonly studied by social psychologists, nor does it comprise a large portion of the instances of everyday influence. Rather, the important forms of influence involve behavior change that is mediated by the behavior-production systems of the influenced person. The nature of this mediation becomes clear when it is recognized that one person may influence the social awareness form engaged by another, and so guide the other to a fixed range of behavioral options. Quite simply, we are

influenced by others when they lead us to adopt a form of awareness we otherwise would not adopt.

Influence properties of awareness forms. What forms of awareness might an influencing agent find useful in a person to be influenced? Perhaps the most obvious answer to this question is tacit awareness of the agent. A person in this form of awareness would be concerned with perceiving and judging the world as the agent does, interested in focalizing things of importance to the agent, and motivated to attain the agent's goals and solve the agent's problems. Certainly, a few dozen people tacitly aware of oneself would make splendid items to have around the house. When such individuals became focally aware of themselves or their group, an additional benefit of their tacit awareness of oneself would be revealed. These people would perceive and evaluate themselves and their group in accord with one's interests, and so regulate themselves to keep one happy. To the degree that one wants others to emulate, serve, and conform to oneself, the establishment of tacit awareness of oneself in them seems to be a powerful tool.

An influencing agent might find the development of tacit group awareness in others useful for similar reasons. If another can be made tacitly aware of a group comprised of self and the influencing agent, then group goals will be foremost in the other's mind. These goals may not suit the agent exactly, but they are likely to be more acceptable than the other's goals alone. When a couple is selecting a package of cold cuts at the grocery, for example, he with salami in mind and she thinking bologna, both might be able to agree that pimento loaf is best for the group. If the female finds the male reaching for salami, her interests as an influence agent could at least be partially served if she were to initiate tacit group awareness, with its accompanying pimento loaf, in his mind. To the degree that group goals correspond with the individual goals of the influencing agent, tacit group awareness in others can provide the agent with goal attainment.

The influencing agent could also wield some power, however, merely by taking advantage of a person's tacit self awareness. When an agent has enough knowledge of a person's tacit self to predict with some certainty what the person would do in confronting a particular focal target, the agent may find it useful to alert the person to a specific focus. The back-seat driver who wishes to avoid a wreck needs only to point out the approaching hazard to the front-seat driver, trusting that such redirection of this person's focal awareness will have the intended effect regardless of the person's current tacit stance. A reliance on the person's tacit self is commonly a part of yet other awareness manipulations that may provide a basis for influence. The influencing agent may find it effective to arrange for the person to focus on the self in focal self awareness, or for the person to become focally aware of a group in which he or she is a member. In these cases, the person being influenced may come to evaluate the self or the self's group with reference to some tacit perspective—one with which the influencing agent is sympathetic. Any self-regulation or group-regulation that ensues could be just what the influencing agent had in mind. Finally, we might note that the agent may often find that a necessary first step to any of these awareness changes in a person is the establishment of the person's focal awareness of

the agent. In short, one often must gain another's attention to have an impact on the other's state of mind.

There may be yet other awareness forms that can serve as avenues to influence. We have presented here some of the most clear and frequent illustrations of influence mediated by the influence target's form of social awareness. In so doing, we have spoken of influence as though it were always a calculated strategy on the part of the influencing agent. We should emphasize at this point that the use of awareness forms in the enterprise of social influence is perhaps more often an unplanned, natural occurrence. Influence agents may lead people to adopt new tacit perspectives and new focal targets without intending to do so or even realizing what has happened once the influence episode is complete. Behavioral contagion in crowds, loyal adherence to the wishes of a beloved leader, and many other instances of influence, after all, may occur without any special planning by an influence agent.

Influence by instigation. A person influences another by instigating an awareness form in the other. Such instigation may take place by way of one or more of the three major forms of awareness instigation: attentional, affective, or symbolic. With attentional instigation, an influencing agent may take advantage of the perceptual proclivities of others, making others focally aware of certain targets by enhancing target salience or making them tacitly aware of certain entities by increasing entity cue value. With affective instigation, the influencing agent can introduce or draw on existing evaluative or emotional tendencies in others, leading them toward particular tacit and focal stances. With symbolic instigation, the influencing agent can ask others for particular awareness forms, using others' propensities to regulate themselves in accord with social feedback and self-evaluation to motivate changes. The symbolic instigational function of norms, roles, and scripts makes this path to influence responsible for the induction of the complex sequences and patterns of awareness that integrate social interaction. In short, the varieties of instigation suggest a broad spectrum of means by which individuals influence each other's awareness, and thus influence each other's behavior.

The social awareness analysis of influence provides a unifying system within which many social influence processes and tactics can find representation. The apparent enigma of the young child who treats his parents to frequent temper tantrums, for example, can be interpreted in terms of the child's influence on his parents' awareness; we would argue that gaining his parents' focal awareness by these means often allows the child to cue the parents to tacit awareness of him. He gets his way through manipulations of parental awareness. Many influence processes identified by social psychologists are open to similar analysis. The tactic of ingratiation (Jones, 1964), for example, may be interpreted as an influence agent's attempt to establish a positive evaluation of himself or herself in the focal awareness of another person; through evaluative instigation, the other then tends to become tacitly aware of the agent, and so allows the agent to reap the benefits of this sympathetic awareness. The tactic of threat (Deutsch, 1973) or coercion (French & Raven, 1959), in turn, may be understood as the combination of affective and symbolic instigation by an influencing agent. With threat, the agent becomes the target of

negative evaluation, and thus is focalized frequently by the person being influenced. The agent's threatening communication also suggests through symbolic instigation that the person would do well to adopt the agent's tacit perspective, behave in the agent's interest, and monitor the agent's satisfaction by focalizing self from this perspective as well. The threatened person thus finds it necessary to alternate among several forms of awareness—tacit awareness of the agent to find out what the agent wants, and focal awareness of self and of the agent to monitor the agent's satisfaction and continuing threat potential.

These examples of ingratiation and threat bring to light what may be an important general rule. Like ingratiation, there are a number of influence tactics (e.g., information control or the exercise of legitimate power) that have regularly been found to instill private acceptance of influence; like threat or coercion, there are other influence procedures (e.g., the offering of reward or the promise of embarrassment) that seem only to yield public compliance to influence. We believe that those influence tactics that result in private acceptance are ones that operate by instigating only a single form of awareness in the person. Those influence tactics that promote public compliance, in contrast, commonly involve an alternation among two or more awareness forms. One of these is the one the influencing agent wants the person to adopt, whereas the others are usually monitoring awareness forms in which the person focalizes the agent, focalizes the self from the agent's point of view, or otherwise inspects the influence setting in service of determining the degree to which the first awareness form must be engaged. It is this additional awareness of the influence episode that allows the person to revert to the perspective of the tacit self once the influencing agent's instigational tactics are no longer in force.

In concluding our remarks about awareness and influence, it is interesting to reflect briefly on the awareness forms that might be taken by an influencing agent. Cooley (1902) observed in this regard that the best leaders are those who are most sensitive to the perspectives of their followers. The leader who becomes tacitly aware of his or her followers, after all, is in the best position to understand the attentional, affective, and symbolic instigators that might move their awareness in the preferred direction.

Intimacy

The study of intimate relationships has recently become a topic of special interest to social psychologists. Its appeal lies both in the fact that such relationships are common and important facets of everyday life, and in the realization that intimate relations harbor a diverse and complex set of social behaviors unobserved in other forms of interpersonal contact. In this section, we present an overview of the ways in which social awareness forms are implicated in the bonds of intimacy, first by considering how an intimate relationship develops, and then by reviewing some problematic turns that this development may take.

Development of intimacy. As two strangers become acquaintances, then friends, and eventually intimates, they change the way they think about themselves, each other, and their dyadic group. These changes are reflected in the different forms of

awareness that are predominant for such individuals in the earlier and later stages of the relationship. Although each growing relationship may chart a unique course of development as a result of its own special circumstances, we believe there is a fairly standard progression by which awareness patterns may unfold. This progression begins with the usual awareness form by which the lone person tends to apprehend the world—tacit self awareness.

When two people meet, they focalize each other to form what becomes a first impression. Although they each may engage in some focal self awareness, they do this with minimal information about the other's perspective, and so think primarily about how they appear to themselves ("Is my hair something I can be proud of?"). Interspersed with these brief glimpses of self, each is also developing an evaluation of the other in focal other awareness. An initial negative evaluation will of course serve to terminate the relationship at this point, whereas a positive evaluation can serve to continue the development of the progression. Since a positive evaluation of someone in focal other awareness often instigates tacit awareness of that person, two mutually attracted people will change their awareness forms to accommodate each other. Rather than seeing only the other's characteristics in focal awareness ("He's tall, dark, and chubby"), each also moves in tacit other awareness to thoughts about the other's goals, needs, and interests ("He'd probably love to visit a cozy little out-of-the-way fudge warehouse"). Taking the other's perspective naturally entails seeing oneself from the other's stance, so considerable adjustment of one's presented self is attempted. This is managed through frequent self-regulation in accord with the interests of the other, and is the stage that is often fondly recalled by couples who have moved further in the relationship ("I remember when you said you loved my hog calls").

As the couple spends increasing amounts of time together, they share not only themselves, but their activities, interests, and goals. The partner's satisfactions and dissatisfactions become associated with one's own, and the distinctions between self and partner are blurred (cf. Levinger, 1979). As an appreciation of this "oneness" supplants thoughts of "you" and "me," group awareness—both tacit and focal—emerges as the predominant form of understanding in both partners. A transparent representation of the group arises as both partners' principle way of understanding the world; the goals that come to mind are frequently group goals ("Let's go to Disneyworld!"), and the situation evaluations that seem appropriate are often group-determined ("We don't like porridge, thank you"). A detailed opaque representation of the group develops as well; characteristics of the group are readily ascertained ("Here we are—late again"), and evaluations of the group are similarly available ("We certainly make a fine-looking couple"). This "mutuality of being" (Davis, 1973) overtakes the perception of oneself and one's partner as individuals to such a degree that many of the ground rules of social exchange within the group are suspended (cf. Clark & Mills, 1979; Derlega, Wilson, & Chaikin, 1976; Morton, 1978). Between acquaintances, a shared quarter, ride, or secret is customarily returned in short order; between intimates, however, who owes what to whom is of little concern.

Although the earlier stages of a relationship are more often characterized by tacit and focal awareness of self and other as separate social entities, and later stages

by tacit and focal group awareness, any of these awareness forms may still be assumed at any point. Of course, relationships of long duration are likely to ensure that each partner is strongly group aware much of the time. But it is likely that more flexible forms of intimacy occur when partners maintain at least some sense of individuality. Throughout a relationship, it is important on at least some occasions to be focally self aware (to make sure one is doing what is right for oneself), focally other aware (to understand the other as an individual), tacitly other aware (to make sure the goals one assumes for the group are good for the other), and focally aware of the self through the tacit other (to make sure one is good for the other). Problems may arise when any of these awareness forms are unused, for it is then that the partners are less than fully aware of their intimate world.

Problems of intimacy. Difficulties in a relationship may arise at any point, from before the initial encounter to after a stable intimate connection has been established. The relationship can be broken at the outset, of course, if the two people do not evaluate each other positively in focal awareness. If they do evaluate each other as worthy of pursuit, and move toward taking each other's tacit perspective, problems may yet arise when they see themselves from the other's point of view ("He likes me only for my pudding"), or when they discern that the other's goals may be incompatible with their own ("He wants to spend all his time collecting hubcaps"). This incompatibility in early stages can effectively prevent the establishment and maintenance of group goals, and so can interfere with each partner's level of group awareness. As a rule, breaking up is not very hard to do at this point.

In some cases, a relationship may continue to develop into quasi-intimate stages despite atypical awareness patterns. Two people who are extremely interested in each other (and not very self-confident), for example, may develop a stable pattern of doing things to please and satisfy each other. In mutual states of tacit other awareness, they become so sensitive to the other's needs that they fail to consider their own, and so fail to provide their partner with much information concerning them. At the extreme, individuals in this sort of relationship are concerned only with making each other happy, and yet provide each other with minimal prompting on how to do so. The result is a vacuous and unsatisfying relationship for both. The relationship dissolves into a politeness contest reminiscent of the homelife of television couples like Ozzie and Harriet.

A more common quasi-intimate pattern emerges when initial evaluations are asymmetric. The person who evaluates the other more positively in focal awareness will be more inclined to take the other's tacit view, and thereby adopt the other's goals. This relationship often reaches a stable state in which both persons take the tacit stance of the dominant (more liked) partner, evaluating both the situation and the less dominant partner from that point of view. In the stereotyped relationship of the working male and the houseworking female, for example, the wife's role is often seen as a matter of pleasing her husband. Her satisfaction is derived from aiding in the attainment of her husband's goals at home, exulting in his achievements at work, and being what he wants her to be. This kind of quasi-intimate relationship is not limited to such heterosexual homemakers; it may arise in any dyad in which one partner's tacit perspective is frequently adopted by both. And, though it may not represent the most flexible and equal pairing, it still can be stable and satisfying to both partners as long as the initial asymmetric evaluation is maintained.

Even intimate relationships that have developed in a typical fashion are not free from troubles. Group awareness is the most distinctive feature of intimacy, but at the same time it can be the most limiting. It may lead, for instance, to a profound incapacity to recognize the other apart from the relationship. One may often (and wrongly) assume that what is best for the group is best for the other ("I thought we wanted it this way"). In a study by Stephenson (1981), for example, subjects who were group aware did more poorly on a task that required taking the perspective of a fellow group member than did subjects who were self aware. In conceptualizing the world from the group perspective, it is difficult to see the other as an individual and to understand the other's unique point of view.

For the same reason, a person immersed in group awareness may lose a sense of separate identity for self. Without the input from tacit and focal self awareness, the characteristics, goals, and interests of the self fade into those of the group; the self and group become indistinguishable. Although a relationship of this type may be satisfying for the group, the realization of this loss of personal identity may even be enough in some cases to lead a partner to abandon the group ("I need to find myself"). The tendency to fuse self with group can be particularly devastating when the group dissipates. The empty feeling that comes on losing an intimate is a consequence of losing much of one's world view as well. If there is an ideal intimate relationship, then, it may be one in which the intimates have the capacity to take a group perspective in every situation, yet maintain a reserve of self and other awareness to protect their individual identities.

Conclusion

The study of social awareness forms is an attempt to bridge the gap between two very different kinds of theorizing in social psychology. One sort of theory, largely attributable to proponents of social cognition, is responsible for the specification of the cognitive structures and processes whereby the individual apprehends the social world. The other sort of theory, more often developed by those interested in the explanation of social behavior, involves the examination of social stimulus conditions under which particular social behaviors are likely to arise. A social awareness analysis brings these approaches together by drawing on parallel lines of thought that are implicit in each. The lines of thought can both be identified in terms of the notion of "states of mind."

The idea of a "state of mind" can be found in social cognitive psychology when it is recognized that knowledge structures, schemas, cognitive processes, precepts, and the like are activated in a temporal sequence. Although social cognitive psychologists have been remarkably adept at specifying the form of many of these cognitive structures, they have often failed to appreciate the fact that these structures are used by an individual in what artificial intelligence analysts call "real time." People cannot think of everything at once. The social awareness framework emphasizes

this feature of thought by suggesting that people encounter the social world in a sequence of limited and specifiable forms of awareness. Although the awareness forms certainly do not include all the possible mental configurations that might be susceptible to temporal variation, they do encompass a significant subset that have captured the attention of theorists over the years. In outlining the forms and some of their consequences here, we have provided a template for understanding the flow of social consciousness as a succession of states of mind.

The idea of a "state of mind" is also regularly applicable to much of the work on social behavior. As a rule, studies in this theoretical tradition expose people to some social event or stimulus that is implicitly assumed to set up a state of mind in each person. So, for example, events or stimuli are arranged to make the person feel guilty, develop an expectancy, be uncomfortable, attend to something, feel empathic, or the like. The impact of the stimulus, as mediated by the assumed state of mind, is examined in the person's response to yet another stimulus; the investigator checks to see if the guilty person will help someone, if the expectant person will perform differently, and so on. Although social behavior theorists might balk at the representation of their approach in terms of states of mind, it is difficult to find a more appropriate term for underlying mediators ranging from guilt and expectancy to mood, attention, empathy, and beyond. With the social awareness approach, we have selected a specific subset of such mediators for explicit inclusion in a unified system of states of mind. Because each awareness form can be traced to particular instigational factors, and can then be seen as the cause of a particular range of social behavior, these forms are entirely compatible with the social behavior tradition.

In essence, the social awareness framework offers a system of social cognition within which the basic elements of social behavior can find ready representation. The forms of social awareness comprise one important way in which the bristling array of social stimulation is filtered, stabilized, and translated through cognition into coherent sequences of social behavior.

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